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ABSTRACT 
The population of Western Europe (EC plus EFTA) is seen as consisting of three sub- 
populations: the natives, the East-European immigrants, and the non-European 
immigrants. Different immigration levels assumed from Eastern Europe and from the rest 
of the world add to the non-native populations while different levels of "integration" 
describe the transition intensities from the non-native sub-populations to the native 
category. 
The paper gives alternative population projections to 2050 based on six scenarios with 
different assumptions on net migration, "integration", as well as fertility and mortality in 
the three categories. The results indicate that (i) in the case of no further immigration 
the total population of Western Europe will start to decline after 2010; (ii) the rate of 
integration into the native population influences the future size of the non-European 
population much more than alternative levels of immigration; (iii) in the long run the 
Eastern Europeans will be quantitatively insignificant; (iv) the Western European 
population is bound to significant population aging no matter what happens with 
immigration; and (v) in the short to medium run immigrants contribute to the alleviation 
of the pension burden. 
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WHAT DIFFERENCE DO ALTERNATIVE IMMIGRATION AND 
INTEGRATION LEVELS MAKE TO WESTERN EUROPE? 
Wolfgang Lutz and Christopher Prinz 
1. Introduction 
The scientific analysis of migration is full of uncertainties. Much more than the other 
demographic components of population change, mortality and fertility, migration depends 
on short term changes in the field of policy and other hardly predictable fields. While in 
modem societies mortality tends to change very slowly from year to year and even 
fertility which is largely the result of individual behavior only shows annual increases or 
decreases by a few percentage points, migration intensities can double or quadruple from 
one year to another. And the European experience of the past five years is full of 
examples of such entirely unpredicted and very massive fluctuations in migration levels. 
An extreme example for this irregularity and unpredictability of migration streams in 
Europe is immigration into West Germany in 1989. In this one year alone more than 
720,000 ethnic Germans (about half of them from East Germany and half from other 
European countries) entered West Germany which was not much less than the cumulated 
number of ethnic German immigrants (811,000) over the previous nine years 1980-88. 
And over that period ethnic Germans had comprised about 60% of all immigrants to 
West Germany (see Heilig et al. 1990). 
What can demographers, who are asked to prepare population projections, do in the face 
of such tremendous uncertainties, that sometimes seem to come close to chaotic behavior, 
when the death of a politician or the passing of a new law out of a very specific political 
constellation can trigger the migration of millions? One possible reaction for scientists 
is to abstract from short term fluctuations and look at the longer term trends. Under a 
long term perspective patterns are certainly more stable than on an annual basis. But still 
when looking at immigration levels since 1950 in industrialized countries one finds that 
only in the classic immigration countries USA, Canada, and Australia there have been 
rather stable levels of immigration. All European countries show significant long term 
changes. Even France and Germany, the biggest immigration countries in Europe, 
experienced great ups and downs with a peak in the 1960s and a low in early 1980s. A 
number of smaller countries (Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway) switched from 
migration losses to migration gains at around 1960. Another group (Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain) experienced this reversal of pattern around 1975. In a number of 
Eastern European countries net migration has been continuously negative at varying 
levels (Wils 1991). 
Another possible approach for the scientist interested in future migration is to look 
at the economic push and pull factors that underlie the decisions to migrate, or to 
study the socio-cultural aspects and identlfy established channels of migration 
because one of the basic findings of the analysis of international migration over the 
centuries seems to be that migrants follow existing paths. Such analysis can help to 
better understand the potential for migration. A large fraction of the papers 
presented at this conference seem to fall into this category. But talking about 
potentials is different from talking about actual migration. The latter is very much 
dependent on specific short term policies. The introduction of a new visa regulation 
can effectively interrupt a migratory stream no matter how great the migration 
potential if it can be fully enforced. In this sense migration policies have two 
aspects: first the content of the policy itself and second the degree to which the 
policy can be enforced. The proportion of illegal immigrants seems to vary greatly 
from one country to another. A final interesting question in this context is whether 
legal immigration restrictions can in the long run resist strong push factors from 
outside and especially pull factors from inside that will find their lobbies within the 
domestic political establishment. 
For this paper a third general approach was chosen that neither relies on the 
extrapolation of past trends nor exclusively refers to migration potentials as a proxy 
for actual migration. The chosen approach accepts the inherent uncertainty about 
future migration levels and studies the implications of alternative hypothetical 
immigration patterns without passing judgement on their likelihood. A systematic 
comparison of such alternative scenarios, which are nothing but a number of 
alternative if-then calculations, can provide us with a better understanding of what 
aspects of the population structure are rather sensitive to alternative immigration 
patterns and which ones would be hardly affected. This concept is discussed at 
length in a recent book entitled Future Demographic Trends in Europe and North 
America: What Can We Assume Today? (Lutz 1991). In the present paper many 
of the choices for specific fertility, mortality and migration assumptions are based 
on the broader discussions in this book. 
In addition to the level of annual immigration in this paper we also want to 
consider the degree of integration of the immigrants into society and define 
alternative scenarios on this important aspect. As a method we will use multi-state 
population projection models which are essentially cohort-component models of 
population projection which simultaneously project several sub-populations that are 
in exchange with each other, i.e. at each time and age men or women cannot only 
enter the country but also move from one sub-population to another. Chart 1 
depicts the basic structure of the model with three sub-populations within Western 
Europe: natives, East European, and non-European. The assumed alternative levels 
of immigration determine the flow (by age and sex) of migrants into the East 
European and non-European categories. Assumed alternative levels of integration 
determine the flow of people already in Western Europe from the two non-native 
categories into the native category. Children born in Western Europe will belong 
to the category to which their mother belongs. 
Chart 1. Structure of the multi-state population projection model used for the 
scenario calculation. 
As expressed by the title of the paper we attempt to study the impact of alternative 
immigration and integration levels on relative sizes of the three subgroups of the 
population and on age-structural differences that are relevant for social security 
considerations. Since benefits for immigrants under the national social security 
scheme are an important and emotional point of controversy (which often leaves the 
important contribution of immigrants to that system unmentioned), our study will 
be able to shed more light on the actual quantitative side of this issue and on the 
question how social security aspects of aging would be affected by alternative 
immigration patterns. 
2. Definition of Scenarios 
For the purpose of this paper Western Europe has been defined as comprising all 
member countries of the Council of Europe (except Turkey which is a special case) 
that have more than 1 million inhabitants. It includes the following countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Eastern Europe as a region of origin for migrants includes Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Republics 
of the former Soviet Union. The non-European region includes the rest of the world 
with Africa being quantitatively most simicant. 
For our alternative projections the starting population for the year 1985 has been 
divided into three subgroups: West European natives (97.5% in 1985), East 
Europeans living in Western Europe (0.4%) and non-Europeans living in Western 
Europe (2.1%). The composition of the foreign population by region of origin and 
sex was estimated using data from France (census 1982) and Germany (1987), the 
two countries which together host more than half of the total foreign population of 
Western Europe in 1989. The age structure of the foreign population was estimated 
using most recent census information for Belgium (1981), France (1982), Italy 
(1981) and Sweden (1985). 
Since this particular study is mainly interested in the effects different migration 
patterns have on population size and structure, fertility and mortality rates are 
assumed to follow only one path for native Western and Eastern Europeans. The 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for these two groups is assumed to remain constant (1.63 
children per woman in 1989). Constant fertility was assumed because it seems to 
be entirely open and unclear into which direction European fertility will move over 
the next decades. Some countries currently experience an increase in fertility 
(Scandinavia) while others still experience a strong decline (Southern Europe) or 
a stabilization at low fertility rates. For the non-European immigrant population 
alternative TFRs of 2.00 and 3.00 were assumed because many studies show that the 
fertility of immigrants is somewhere between the fertility level of the country of 
origin and that of the host country. 
Life expectancy at birth is assumed to increase linearly from 71.9 years for men and 
78.6 years for men in 1985 up to 90 and 95 years, respectively, in 2050 (see Table 
1). The assumed increase in life expectancy reflects a continuation of the trend 
during the last two decades (see discussions in Manton 1991, Duchene and Wunsch 
1991). This trend is assumed to be identical in all three population groups. 
Concerning immigration flows we assumed three levels of immigratioi: (i) no 
immigration, (ii) continued present immigration, with 500,000 immigrants annually 
from Eastern Europe (only until the year 2000) and 500,000 annually from non- 
European countries (until 2050), and (iii) high immigration, with 500,000 immigrants 
annually from Eastern Europe (only until 2010) and 1500,000 annually from non- 
European countries (linear increase between 1985 and 2010). 
The assumptions on immigration levels are complemented by several alternative 
assumptions concerning the integration of foreigners. We chose to define integration 
by annual integration rates, i.e. the proportions of members of the East European 
and non-European sub-populations that annually move to the native population. 
Unlike some other similar calculations (e.g. Steinmann 1991) this does not assume 
automatic integration of foreigners after a specific time period but assumes 
heterogeneity of the immigrant population with respect to integration probabilities. 
Because a constant rate implies the decrease over time in absolute numbers 
integrated out of given initial stock of foreigners, an integration rate of 10% 
annually results in the integration of approximately 90% after 25 years. 
Table 1. Definition of the demographic assumptions for six scenarios. 
Total Life Annual Annual 
fertility expectancy net integration 
rate malelfem migration rate 
Observed 1.63 71.9178.6 500,000 ? 
No mig./med.int. 
(Scenario 1) 
Natives 1.63 90195 - - 
East Europeans 1.63 90195 0 10 % 
Non-Europeans 2.00 90195 0 5 % 
Med.mig./med.int. 
(Scenario 2) 
Natives 1.63 90195 
East Europeans 1.63 90195 500,000' 10 % 
Non-Europeans 2.00 90195 500,00@ 5 % 
High mig./med.int./ 
TFR 2.0 (Scenario 3) 
Natives 1.63 90195 - - 
East Europeans 1.63 90195 500,00d 10 % 
Non-Europeans 2.00 90195 1500,000~ 5 % 
No int./high mig. 
(Scenario 4) 
Natives 1.63 90195 - - 
East Europeans 1.63 90195 500,00d 10 % 
Non-Europeans 3.00 90195 1500,000~ 0 % 
Med.int./high mig.1 
TFR 3.0 (Scenario 5) 
Natives 1.63 90195 - - 
East Europeans 1.63 90195 500,00d 10 % 
Non-Europeans 3.00 90195 1500,000~ 5 % 
High int./high mig. 
(Scenario 6) 
Natives 1.63 90195 - - 
East Europeans 1.63 90195 500,00d 10 % 
Non-Europeans 3.00 90195 1500,000" 10 % 
Notes: 'constant from 1985 to 2000, no immigration after 2000. 
'constant from 1985 to 2050. 
3constant from 1985 to 2010, no immigration after 2010. 
4between 1985 and 2010 increase from 500,000 to 1500,000; then constant. 
The integration rate of Eastern European immigrants was assumed to be constant 
at 10% per year under all scenarios. For non-European immigrants three levels of 
integration are compared: (i) no integration, (ii) a 5% integration rate annually, 
resulting in approximately 70% integration after 30 years, and (iii) a 10% 
integration rate annually, reflecting a situation in which non-Europeans are 
integrated to the same extent as Eastern Europeans. 
Based on a cross-classification of the different immigration, integration and fertility 
assumptions we defined the following six scenarios that are also listed in Table 1. 
Scenarios 1 to 3 consider the lower fertility rate (TFR=2.0) and the medium annual 
integration rate (5%) for non-Europeans. They only differ with respect to 
immigration: no, continued and high immigration are compared. Scenarios 1,2 and 
3 are labeled "No immigration, medium integration", "Continued immigration, 
medium integration" and "High immigration, medium integration, TFR 2.0, 
respectively. Scenarios 4 to 6 consider the high immigration alternative together 
with higher fertility (TFR=3.0) among non-Europeans. They only differ with 
respect to integration of foreigners, comparing the 0%, 5% and 10% annual 
integration rates. Scenarios 4, 5 and 6 are labeled "No integration, high 
immigration", "Medium integration, high immigration, TFR 3.0 and "High 
integration, high immigration", respectively. If one would like to compare the low 
and high fertility assumptions, then scenarios 3 and 5, both using high immigration 
and medium integration, should be compared. 
3. Selected Results 
3.1. Total population size 
Table 2 gives the total population size of the 16 Western European countries 
calculated up to the year 2050 under the alternative scenarios considered. These 
figures include all three subgroups of the population. Since mortality and fertility 
(except for the non-Europeans) are kept constant, one can expect that the 
differences in future population size directly result from alternative immigration 
levels. But also different integration rates should have an independent impact on 
population size because we have assumed higher fertility rates for the non-European 
population, and if their size increases less quickly due to greater integration they 
will have a smaller weight and hence reduce the average fertility of the total 
population. 
As expected only the no-immigration scenario 1 will result in a decline in the total 
size of the Western European population. This is the consequence of sub- 
replacement fertility. Mostly due to the young age structure, the total population 
would continue to increase from presently 378 million to around 390 million in 2010 
and decline thereafter. As we will see later the no-immigration case will be resulting 
in an extreme aging of the population. 
Table 2. Total population size by scenario (in million people). 
Year 
1990 
2000 
20 10 
2020 
2030 
2040 
2050 
No mig.1 
med. int. 
(Scen. 1) 
378 
387 
390 
389 
3 84 
374 
360 
Cont. mig.1 
med. int. 
(Scen. 2) 
High mig.1 
med. int. 
TFR 2.0 
(Scen. 3) 
No int.1 
high mig. 
(Scen. 4) 
378 
403 
430 
459 
489 
519 
553 
Med. int.1 
high mig. 
TFR 3.0 
(Scen. 5) 
High int.1 
high mig. 
(Scen. 6) 
378 
402 
428 
454 
477 
497 
5 14 
Scenarios 3, 4, 5, and 6 all assume high immigration into Western Europe and will 
result in a significant increase of the total population to between 500 and 553 
million by the year 2050 depending on different average fertility levels which are the 
result of alternative integration assumptions. Scenario 2 which assumes immigration 
to continue around the present level has an intermediate position resulting in a 
more moderate increase of the Western European population to 419 million by 
205 0. 
Figure 1 plots the annual growth rates that underlie the changes in population size 
given in Table 1. Due to the assumption that immigration would only gradually 
increase to its maximum level by 2010 and remain constant thereafter we see a 
slight discontinuity for all growth rates around that year. Under all scenarios, except 
the very extreme case of scenario 4 (high immigration-no integration), growth rates 
will show a long term decreasing trend that at some point will result in decreasing 
population sizes. As mentioned above, under the no-immigration scenario 1 this will 
already be the case before 2020; in the medium-immigration scenario 2 it will 
happen around 2030; and even under the high immigration scenario 3 the Western 
European population will start to shrink by the middle of the next century. This 
clearly demonstrates that in the very long run the effect of low fertility can outweigh 
even very strong immigration if the immigrants at some point adopt European sub- 
replacement fertility levels. 
Average annual rate of natural increase 
0.5% 
- No mig.lmed.int. -. - No inthigh mig. 
- - -  Cont.mig./med.int. ...... Med.int.high mig./TFR 3.0 
-..- High mig./med.int./TFR 2.0 - - High int.high mig. 
Figure 1. Annual rates of population increase under different scenarios. 
3.2. Population composition by groups 
In the year 1990 2.4% of the total population of Western Europe is assumed to 
belong to the group of non-European immigrants. According to scenario 1 which 
assumes no immigration at all in the future this proportion will greatly decline 
through integration and approach zero by the middle of the next century. Under all 
other scenarios the proportion of non-Europeans is expected to increase, although 
at quite different rates according to the immigration and integration scenarios. 
In the case of very high immigration and no integration at all (together with a TFR 
of migrants of 3.00) the proportion of non-Europeans in Europe will increase 
strongly and rapidly to one-third of the total population in 2050. This in a way is the 
horror scenario frequently painted by certain politicians and media. It essentially 
describes a dual society of two groups with little to no interactions and a great 
probability for hostilities. As the comparison to scenarios 5 and 6 will show, 
however, this situation is only to a lesser extent caused by high migration levels but 
more importantly by the complete lack of integration into the native society, 
whether it be due to the complete failure of integration policies or the lack of will 
to integrate on either side. Scenario 6, for instance, which assumes a 10% annual 
integration rate for non-Europeans will only result in 4.9% of non-Europeans by 
2050 under the same high immigration assumption. Hence integration makes a 
difference by a factor of 6. Even a low 5% annual integration rate (scenario 5) 
would result in a non-European proportion that is smaller by a factor of about 3. 
Table 3. Proportion of non-Europeans in Western Europe (in %). 
In the case of very high immigration and no integration at all (together with a TFR 
of migrants of 3.00) the proportion of non-Europeans in Europe will increase 
strongly and rapidly to one-third of the total population in 2050. This in a way is the 
horror scenario frequently painted by certain politicians and media. It essentially 
describes a dual society of two groups with little to no interactions and a great 
probability for hostilities. As the comparison to scenarios 5 and 6 will show, 
however, this situation is only to a lesser extent caused by high migration levels but 
more importantly by the complete lack of integration into the native society, 
whether it be due to the complete failure of integration policies or the lack of will 
to integrate on either side. Scenario 6, for instance, which assumes a 10% annual 
integration rate for non-Europeans will only result in 4.9% of non-Europeans by 
2050 under the same high immigration assumption. Hence integration makes a 
difference by a factor of 6. Even a low 5% annual integration rate (scenario 5) 
would result in a non-European proportion that is smaller by a factor of about 3. 
Scenario 2 which essentially assumes a continuation of present (medium level) 
immigration together with 5Yo annual integration (also medium level) would only 
result in a small increase in the proportions of non-Europeans to 3.6% of the total 
population by 2050. This is a scenario that should be relatively easily manageable 
by society and that would have many economic advantages stemming from age 
structural consideration (as discussed in the following section) when compared to 
the no-immigration scenario. 
As to the Eastern European sub-population in Western Europe, Table 4 
demonstrates the insignificant quantitative impact of this group. Due to lower 
cumulative numbers of immigrants and the undoubtedly higher integration rate 
Cont. mig./ 
med. int. 
(Scen. 2) 
2.4 
2.9 
3.1 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
High rnig.1 
med. int. 
TFR 2.0 
(Scen. 3) 
2.4 
3.6 
5.2 
6.7 
7.7 
8.2 
8.5 
Year 
1990 
2000 
2010 
2020 
2030 
2040 
2050 
No mig.1 
med. int. 
(Scen. 1) 
2.4 
1.7 
1.1 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
No int.1 
high mig. 
(Scen. 4) 
2.4 
5.2 
9.2 
14.5 
20.3 
26.6 
33.3 
Med. int.1 
high mig. 
TFR 3.0 
(Scen. 5) 
2.4 
3.8 
5.6 
7.4 
8.5 
9.2 
9.6 
High int.1 
high mig. 
(Scen. 6) 
2.4 
2.9 
3.9 
4.7 
5.0 
5.0 
4.9 
Eastern Europeans will at no point--even under high East-West migration 
assumptions--comprise more than 1.6% of the Western European population. This 
peak of 1.6% is reached in 2010 under scenario 3. Due to an assumed end to 
significant East-West migration by 2010 and high integration there will be virtually 
no East European sub-population left in Western Europe by 2050. 
Table 4. East Europeans in Western Europe by scenario (in million people). 
Year 
immigration 
(Scenario 1) 
Immigration 
until 2000 
(Scenario 2) 
Immigration 
until 2010 
(Scenarios 3 to 6) 
Figure 2 finally describes the annual balance between the number of new arrivals 
into Western Europe and the persons leaving the non-native sub-populations due 
to integration. It is interesting to see that in all scenarios (except for scenario 4 
which assumes no integration at all) the balance is negative at least after 2020 
which means that the annual number of persons integrated is larger than the 
number of persons arriving. The reason for this negative balance despite high 
immigration is that the stock of non-Europeans has increased to such a degree that 
the 10% annual integration results in higher absolute numbers per year. Still, this 
negative balance does not imply that the non-European population is decreasing 
because this population also grows through their own children. Again, this points 
at the important long t e rn  impact of fertility levels even within the non-native 
populations. A comparison of scenarios 3 and 5 shows that a TFR of 3.00 among 
the non-European population results in about a 20% larger size of that group as 
compared to a TFR of 2.00 under otherwise identical assumptions. 
Balance of new arrivals and integrations 
- No mig./med.int. -.- No lnt./high mig. 
-..- High mig./med.int.FFR 2.0 - - High Int./high mig. 
Figure 2. Balance of new amvals and integrations. 
3.3. Effects on the age structure and demographic dependency 
Under an economic perspective age structural considerations are of great 
importance. The proportion of economically active people as compared to the 
pensioners has been changing in an adverse direction for some time mostly due to 
population aging and a decline in the mean age at retirement in some cases. For 
the next 30-50 years a dramatic worsening of this relationship is foreseen for purely 
demographic reasons. The large birth cohorts of the baby boom of the early 1960s 
will reach retirement age while the number of people in the economically active 
ages is significantly shrinking due to the generally very low fertility since the 1970s. 
Alternative population projections for Europe and North America (Lutz et al. 1991) 
have shown that the mean age of the population in Western Europe could even 
increase by 20 years from presently 37 years to 57 years by 2050 under a fertility 
and mortality decline scenario. All other scenarios also indicate strong increases in 
the mean age and even those assuming increasing fertility to replacement level 
foresee an increase well into the 40s. This implies that even in the most optimistic 
case (high fertility) the proportion above age 65 would increase from presently 14% 
to more than 22%. In most other scenarios it increases much stronger, even to 
levels of up to 44%. The very likely fact that the pension burden will at least double 
over the coming decades will be one of the major economic and socio-political 
challenges of the near future. 
It is evident that immigration may have a direct impact on the demographic 
dependency ratios if it is age selective, i.e. if the age distribution of immigrants is 
different from that of the resident population. And since immigrants tend to come 
in their young adulthood they increase--at least in the short run--the proportion of 
the population in the active age group 15-64. In the long run the positive effects of 
immigration on demographic dependence is less clearcut because, unless they return 
to their home country, migrants will also age and eventually draw on retirement 
benefits. What will happen in the long run to demographic dependency depends on 
the specific conditions assumed, whether migrants have higher fertility than the rest 
of the population, higher mortality, and whether the stream of new immigrants 
increases or decreases or remains constant. Generally, under homogeneous fertility 
and mortality conditions the stream of immigrants would have to be continuously 
increasing to have a long term positive effect on demographic old age dependency 
ratios. 
In our paper which studies the specific effects of alternative immigration and 
integration levels we get the following results under the stated fertility and mortality 
conditions (see Table 5): The increase in the proportion elderly of the total 
population (natives plus immigrants) ranges from about 20 percentage points in the 
case of the no-immigration scenario 1 to 12 percentage points in the case of the 
high immigration/no integration scenario 4 that results in 33.3% non-Europeans as 
discussed earlier. Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings: (i) the 
proportion of the population older than 65 is going to increase significantly under 
all circumstances, and (ii) under a time horizon till 2050 immigration to Western 
Europe tends to lower the proportion of the population above age 65. 
Table 5. Proportion of elderly aged 65 and over in Western Europe (in %). 
Year 
1990 
2000 
2010 
2020 
2030 
2040 
2050 
Cont. mig./ 
med. int. 
(Scen. 2) 
14.4 
15.9 
17.9 
21.3 
26.0 
30.4 
32.5 
No mig./ 
med. int. 
(Scen. 1) 
14.4 
16.3 
18.8 
22.7 
28.0 
32.8 
34.9 
High rnig.1 
med. int. 
TFR 2.0 
(Scen. 3) 
14.4 
15.7 
17.3 
19.9 
23.8 
27.3 
29.0 
No kt./ 
high mig. 
(Scen. 4) 
14.4 
15.7 
17.2 
19.5 
22.9 
25.6 
26.3 
Med. kt./ 
high mig. 
TFR 3.0 
(Scen. 5) 
14.4 
15.7 
17.2 
19.7 
23.3 
26.5 
27.8 
High int./ 
high mig. 
(Scen. 6) 
14.4 
15.7 
17.3 
19.7 
23.5 
26.8 
28.3 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from another indicator of aging, namely the 
mean age of the population which has a smoother trend than the proportion above 
age 65 because it is less affected by intercohort differences in size. Figure 3 plots 
the changes in the mean ages of the total population, the native population and the 
non-European population under various scenarios. In the starting year 1990 the 
difference between the total and the non-European mean age is more than 10 years 
(37.7 versus 27.2) and increases in most scenarios significantly until 2050 to between 
12 years (scenario 4) and 21 years (scenario 6). Only the no-immigration scenario 
will bring about a significant aging of the already resident non-European population, 
which will be irrelevant in its size, however (0.18% of the population in 2050). The 
increasing difference in the mean age is due to the fact that the native population 
will age rapidly whereas the non-European population tends to have a constant or 
even slightly decreasing mean age. This stability and decrease is caused by three 
factors: new young immigrants, higher fertility, and the fact that a certain proportion 
is integrated into the native population where they will continue their aging process. 
Mean age of the population 
Non-Europeans Scenario 2 - 
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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Figure 3. Mean ages of total, native and non-European population under six 
scenarios for 1990-2050. 
Immigrants usually do not only contribute to the economic production in the host 
country and pay taxes from their incomes but, if legally employed, they also 
contribute directly to the pension funds. These contributions are presently used to 
pay for the pensions of native residents, because very few non-natives already have 
entitlements to pensions. If pensions are not accumulated on the basis of personal 
savings policies but present contributions are being used to pay for present pensions 
--as is the case in most European countries--then the following comparison of the 
distribution of contributions and benefits by sub-populations may give interesting 
insights. The following table is purely based on demographic dependency ratios and 
does not consider actual monetary contributions and benefits which are much more 
complex to calculate. But the demographic figures should indicate the general 
tendency. 
Table 6. How much does the pension fund benefit from non-natives under 
different scenarios? 
b 
Year/ 
scenario 
1990 
2050 
No mig./ 
med. int. 
(Scenario 1) 
Cont. mig./ 
med. int. 
(Scenario 2) 
High mig./ 
med. int.12.0 
(Scenario 3) 
No int./ 
high mig. 
(Scenario 4) 
Med. int./ 
high mig.13.0 
(Scenario 5) 
High int.1 
high mig. 
(Scenario 6) 
Among 1000 
people aged 15-64 
Non- 
Natives Natives 
963 37 
998 2 
954 46 
896 104 
635 365 
892 108 
943 57 
Among 1000 
people aged 65 + 
Non- 
Natives Natives 
996 4 
998 2 
992 8 
983 17 
875 125 
983 17 
996 4 
Index 
of 
benefit 
from 
Nan- 
Natives 
100 
97 
101 
106 
133 
107 
102 
Index 
of 
burden 
on 
Non- 
Natives 
100 
14 
62 
67 
32 
70 
156 
Table 6 has several parts. The first two columns show how many of 1000 people at 
working age (15-64) are natives or belong to one of the other sub-populations (East 
Europeans and non-Europeans together). Figures are given for the present situation 
and for 2050 under the various scenarios. We see that except for the no-immigration 
scenario 1 the proportions of non-natives in the active age will increase in all cases, 
in scenario 4 even tenfold. This can be compared to the middle section of the table 
which gives the number of natives and non-natives out of 1000 people of 
pensionable age (above age 65). At present the proportions of non-native elderly 
and non-native of active age are different by a factor of 9, i.e. nine times more non- 
natives contribute to the pension fund than benefit from it. In the year 2050 this 
difference will be reduced to a factor of 6 under scenarios 2, 3, and 5 and to a 
factor of 3 under scenario 4. Under scenario 6 it would increase to a factor of 14. 
In any case the non-native population as a group (which is different from individuals 
who might join the native group) contributes significantly more to the pension fund 
than they ever will benefit under any scenario. Under scenarios 3-5 this contribution 
accounts for more than 10% of the total pension fund. 
Another way to summarize the possible future changes in the contributions-benefits 
relationship for non-native groups in the population is the calculation of two indexes 
given on the right side of Table 6: The "index of benefit from non-natives" gives the 
ratio between the proportions native among those 15-64 and 65+, which is set to 
equal 100 in 1990, and the "index of burden on non-natives" which gives the same 
ratios for the proportions non-native. The alternative forecasts to the year 2050 
show that in all cases (except for the no-immigration case) the benefit from non- 
natives for the pension system is likely to increase mostly because of the youthful 
age of the non-natives; in the "horror" scenario 4 it would even increase very 
substantially by one-third. For the non-native population itself the situation is also 
likely to improve in all cases except for that of the high integration scenario 6. This 
improvement in the pension burden on the non-natives is determined by the fact 
that by the year 2050 a much higher number of non-natives will also consume 
pensions and therefore will lead to a more balanced relationship between 
contributions and benefits than in the presently very distorted case. 
4. Summary 
The above described scenario calculations tried to give some sensitivity analysis on 
what alternative levels of immigration and integration into the Western European 
population would mean to total population size, to the relative sizes of the three 
sub-populations considered (natives, East Europeans, and non-Europeans), and to 
the age structure of the population including the question of demographic 
dependency. In short the main findings--which are subject to the model 
specifications and assumptions described above--are: 
In the case of no further immigration the total population of Western Europe 
would start to decline (under the assumed fertility and mortality levels) after 
the year 2010. Under assumed high immigration it could increase by 50% or 
more over the next 60 years. 
The proportion of non-Europeans within Western Europe will increase from 
presently 2.4% under all scenarios except in the case of no-immigration. It 
turns out that the rate of integration into the native population (assumed to 
be 0%, 5%, or 10% alternatively) influences the future size of the non- 
European population much greater than the assumed alternative levels of 
immigration. 
In the long run the group of East Europeans in Western Europe will be 
quantitatively insignificant because of high assumed integration and a likely 
decrease of immigration flows after 2010. 
The population of Western Europe is bound to significant population aging no 
matter what happens with immigration. Even strong immigration (unless it is 
indefinitely growing from year to year) will in the long run hardly affect the 
aging trend. 
In the short to medium run, however, immigrants contribute to the alleviation 
of the pension burden because of their youthful age. Non-natives contribute 
significantly more to the pension fund than they benefit from it. 
This paper could show that already rather simple calculations can give interesting 
and in some cases even surprising findings, as for instance the greater significance 
of integration as opposed to immigration levels. For a deeper understanding and 
more concrete policy recommendations, however, significantly more effort in 
studying the factors associated with immigration and integration would be needed. 
On the other hand, given the extreme unpredictability of immigration patterns, for 
longer term considerations simple calculations might be the best one can do at 
present. 
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